[2/3] How States Think: The Rationality of Foreign Policy (How States Think: The Rationality of Foreign Policy) (Politics column)
Continue. story It should be noted that the authors’ rationality model contains two layers. 1. Rationality of objectives (goal rationality). The survival of the state is almost always the first priority; the rest are subordinated to this. 2. Rationality of strategies (strategic rationality). Finally, strategic decisions
- Relying on a credible theory. (Realistic assumptions, consistent causal logic, data/history support)and Appeared from an open and "unsuppressive" discussion procedure (without silence, pressure, distortion of information). Evaluate the process, not just the result.
The key to their school of thought is the difference between risk and uncertainty. In international politics, there are often no reliable frequencies/basic probabilities, so pure EV/Expected Utility calculations are not applicable – it makes sense to build reliable theories + scenario analysis and “worst case testing”.
Here's what the book's critique of standard approaches looks like 1. Against the expected utility. Models where rationality = calculating expected utility assume measurable probabilities and stable preferences, a rarity in foreign policy. Therefore, it is wrong to require states to “calculate the EU in their heads”; it is more reasonable to assess the quality of the theory applied and the quality of the process. 2. Against "everything is biased." Political psychology/behavioral economics often declares deviations from expected utility to be “irrational.” (bias), resting on analogy, heuristics, "group thinking". The authors respond: Heuristics - irrationality, if they are built into a coherent theory and Group procedures in the state apparatus often smooth out individual distortions. Most importantly, these approaches hardly explain how individual opinions are aggregated into government decisions.
If we talk about the engineering interpretation, the authors propose to change the metric of rationality assessment from “whether the agent considered the correct expected value” to “whether the agent had a valid model of the world + a normal review-decision process.”
The authors confirm their model by analyzing situations that, according to the authors, were unfairly called irrational. - It all starts with SVO. 2022 year - in the foreword of the book is understood as a case where the West quickly hung the label of "madness", but the authors consider the decision theoretically motivated (Balance of Power, NATO) and debated at the elite level. Germany, entry into the First World War (1914) Preventive logic against the growing power of rivals and a window of vulnerability. - Japan, hit Pearl Harbor. (1941) An attempt to disable the U.S. Pacific Fleet and secure resources; a risky strategy, not an “irrational impulse.” - Germany, Barbarossa. (1941) The authors show that key figures reasoned in terms of hard power realism. (division of resources of the USSR/UK, etc.). Controversially, in their metric it is a rational theory + process.
- NATO expansion after the Cold War While Mearsheimer himself criticized expansion, it is a rational decision based on legitimate liberal theories. (democratic peace, institutionalism, interdependence).
- and so on.
There are also examples of really irrational decisions. (where the theory + process link is broken) Germany’s Risk Strategy before World War I Organizational and cognitive distortions, gaps/closing of key information, qualitative verification of the theory is not provided. Invasion of Cuba aka Bay of Pigs, USA (1961) A small "club" intercepted the process, critical signals ignored, and there is no normal discussion. Iraq, U.S. invasion. (2003) Suppression of alternatives, weak empirical basis of theory (WMD/Democratization through Force), distortions in the process.
And what can be learned from this for work, we will discuss in next.
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